Author: amit

  • Preparatory Program 2027 — Registration Open

    Registration is open for the Preparatory Program for the 2027 intake of the ISI MS/PhD entrance in Quantitative Economics. Live online lectures begin on Sunday, 14 June 2026, and run about 2.5 hours each Sunday — roughly 100 hours of instruction in total, covering Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, Mathematics, Probability, Statistics, and Econometrics. The fee is Rs. 80,000 and includes the integrated Test Series.

    Full details — syllabus, schedule, eligibility, and how to register — are on the Preparatory Program page.

  • Utility maximisation and expenditure minimisation under satiated preferences

    This tool shows UMP and EMP when preferences are satiated: there is a bliss point \( (\delta_x, \delta_y) \) where utility peaks, and utility falls as the bundle moves away from it. Preferences are therefore non-monotone — more is not always better (local nonsatiation fails). When the bliss point is affordable, the consumer always buys it, whatever their income, and leaves unspent any income beyond its cost, so the budget need not bind and Walras’ law fails. These are the definitions of UMP and EMP.

    \[ \text{(UMP)}\qquad \max_{(x,y) \in \mathbb{R}^2_+}\; u(x,y) \quad\text{s.t.}\quad p_x x + p_y y \le M \] \[ \text{(EMP)}\qquad \min_{(x,y) \in \mathbb{R}^2_+}\; \bigl(p_x x + p_y y\bigr) \quad\text{s.t.}\quad u(x,y) \ge \bar u \]

    Choose how distance is measured and a problem, then move the bliss point, prices, and income, and watch the optimal bundle respond.

    What to look for
    • Lower the prices or raise income until the bliss point is affordable. Does the consumer still always spend all income?
    • Make the bliss point unaffordable. Where does the optimum sit relative to the budget line and the bliss point?
    • Switch the distance measure between Euclidean and taxicab, and observe how the optimum changes.

  • Utility maximisation and expenditure minimisation under convex preferences

    This tool shows UMP and EMP when preferences are convex, i.e., when the upper-contour set \( \{\, (x,y)\in\mathbb{R}^2_+ : u(x,y) \ge \bar u \,\} \) is convex. Each of the four utilities considered in the tool has a convex upper-contour set, so the set of optimal bundles is always convex. These are the definitions of UMP and EMP.

    \[ \text{(UMP)}\qquad \max_{(x,y) \in \mathbb{R}^2_+}\; u(x,y) \quad\text{s.t.}\quad p_x x + p_y y \le M \] \[ \text{(EMP)}\qquad \min_{(x,y) \in \mathbb{R}^2_+}\; \bigl(p_x x + p_y y\bigr) \quad\text{s.t.}\quad u(x,y) \ge \bar u \]

    Choose a utility function and a problem, then move the prices and income and watch the optimal bundle respond.

    What to look for
    • Find the interior tangency on the smooth arm. Does the MRS equal the price ratio there?
    • Move the price ratio until the optimum sits at a kink in EMP. Observe the range of price ratios for which it remains optimal.
    • Slide a price slowly. Does demand jump, or move continuously?
    • Switch between UMP and EMP, and observe the nature of the optimal bundle.

  • Utility maximisation and expenditure minimisation under non-convex preferences

    This tool shows UMP and EMP when preferences are non-convex, i.e., when the upper-contour set \( \{\, (x,y)\in\mathbb{R}^2_+ : u(x,y) \ge \bar u \,\} \) is non-convex. Each of the four utilities considered in the tool has a non-convex upper-contour set. These are the definitions of UMP and EMP.

    \[ \text{(UMP)}\qquad \max_{(x,y) \in \mathbb{R}^2_+}\; u(x,y) \quad\text{s.t.}\quad p_x x + p_y y \le M \] \[ \text{(EMP)}\qquad \min_{(x,y) \in \mathbb{R}^2_+}\; \bigl(p_x x + p_yy\bigr) \quad\text{s.t.}\quad u(x,y) \ge \bar u \]

    Choose a utility function and a problem, then move the prices and income and watch the optimal bundle respond.

    What to look for
    • Find the tangency point, if it exists. Is it the best bundle?
    • Slide a price through the knife-edge. Does demand move smoothly, or jump?
    • Switch between UMP and EMP, and observe the nature of the optimal bundle.
  • Seeing Probability — workshop

    A two-day live workshop  ·  25 July & 1 August 2026 ·  10:00 AM – 2:00 PM IST (10:00–11:30, break, 12:30–2:00)

    This workshop uses Python to make two central ideas in probability — the Law of Large Numbers and the Central Limit Theorem — easier to see and understand. Students who already know probability in theory will use simulations to observe what convergence actually looks like, when it does not occur as expected, and why it matters.

    Python is used as a tool to explore the mathematics, not as a separate subject. No prior programming experience is required, but students should be familiar with undergraduate-level probability.

    What you’ll do

    • Build sampling and simulation from first principles in NumPy
    • Compute expectations and variances by Monte Carlo, and understand the statistical properties of the estimates themselves
    • Watch the LLN converge and watch it fail when its assumptions are violated
    • See the CLT emerge from different distributions, and see where it breaks
    • Work on a problem set between the two sessions, with selected submissions discussed at the start of Day 2

    Format

    Two 3-hour live sessions, one week apart. Choose your mode at registration:

    • In person at YWCA of Delhi
    • Online via Google Meet

    Limited to 20 students across both modes. All code runs in Google Colab — no installation required.

    Fee

    ₹2,500  ·  same fee for both modes

    Also see: Workshops & Other Courses

  • Cournot duopoly with asymmetric marginal costs

    A two-firm Cournot problem with different marginal costs — try it before opening the solution.

    Two firms produce a homogeneous good. Inverse market demand is

    \[ \begin{aligned} p^d(q) = \begin{cases}12-q & \text{if } q ≤ 12 \\ 0 & \text{if } q > 12 \end{cases} \end{aligned} \]

    Firm \( 1 \) has constant marginal cost \( c_1 = 1 \) and firm \( 2 \) has constant marginal cost \( c_2 = 2 \). The firms compete in quantities, choosing \(q_1\) and \(q_2\) simultaneously.

    Find the Nash (Cournot) equilibrium quantities \( (q_1^*, q_2^*) \), the market price, and each firm’s profit.

    Hint

    Each firm maximizes its own profit taking the rival’s quantity as given. Write firm \( i \)’s profit, find a best-response function in \( q_j \). Two best responses, two unknowns.

    Solution

    For \( q = q_1+q_2 \in [0,12] \), inverse demand is \( p = 12-q \). Firm \( 1 \) chooses \( q_1 \in [0, 12-q_2] \) to maximize

    \[ \pi_1 = \big(12-(q_1 + q_2)-1\big)\, q_1. \]

    when \( q_2 < 12 \).

    The first-order condition gives the best-response for the case \( q_2 < 11 \):

    \[ \begin{aligned} 11-2q_1-q_2 &= 0 \\ \Rightarrow\quad q_1 &= \frac{11-q_2}{2}. \end{aligned} \]

    For \( q_2 \ge 11 \), its best response is to choose \( q_1 = 0 \).

    So, the best response function of firm 1 is

    \[ \begin{aligned} \text{BR}_1(q_2) = \begin{cases} \left\{\dfrac{11-q_2}{2}\right\} & \text{if } q_2 < 11 \\ \{0\} & \text{if } q_2 \geq 11 \end{cases} \end{aligned} \]

    Similarly, the best response function of firm 2 is

    \[ \begin{aligned} \text{BR}_2(q_1) = \begin{cases} \left\{\dfrac{10-q_1}{2}\right\} & \text{if } q_1 < 10 \\ \{0\} & \text{if } q_1 \geq 10 \end{cases} \end{aligned} \]
    Cournot Duopoly Equilibrium with asymmetric marginal costs

    Solving the two best responses simultaneously:

    \[ q_i^* = 4, \quad q_2^*= 3. \]

    Total output and price follow:

    \[ q^* = 7, \quad p^* = 5. \]

    Profits are

    \[ \pi_1^* = 16, \quad \pi_2^* = 9. \]

    The lower-cost firm produces more and earns more.